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We consider the problem of optimizing the placement of stubborn agents in a social network in order to
maximally impact population opinions. We assume individuals in a directed social network each have a
latent opinion that evolves over time in response to social media posts by their neighbors. The individuals
randomly communicate noisy versions of their latent opinion to their neighbors. Each individual updates his
opinion using a time-varying update rule that has him become more stubborn with time and be less affected
by new posts. The dynamic update rule is a novel component of our model and reflects realistic behaviors
observed in many psychological studies.
We show that in the presence of stubborn agents with immutable opinions and under fairly general
conditions on the stubbornness rate of the individuals, the opinions converge to an equilibrium determined
by a linear system. We give an interesting electrical network interpretation of the equilibrium. We also use
this equilibrium to present a simple closed form expression for harmonic influence centrality, which is a
function that quantifies how much a node can affect the mean opinion in a network. We develop a discrete
optimization formulation for the problem of maximally shifting opinions in a network by targeting nodes
with stubborn agents. We show that this is an optimization problem with a monotone and submodular
objective, allowing us to utilize a greedy algorithm. Finally, we show that a small number of stubborn agents
can non-trivially influence a large population using simulated networks.
Key words : Social networks, opinion dynamics, submodular optimization, national security
1. Introduction
Online social networks can be hijacked by malicious actors who run massive influence campaigns
on a population and potentially disrupt societies. There have been multiple reports alleging that
foreign actors attempted to penetrate U.S. social networks in order to manipulate elections (Byrnes
2016, Guilbeault and Woolley 2016, Parlapiano and Lee 2018, Shane 2017). There have been studies
showing similar operations in European elections (Ferrara 2017). The perpetrators created fake
or “bot” accounts which shared politically polarizing content, much of it fake news, in order to
amplify it and extend its reach, or directly interacted with humans to promote their agenda (Shane
2018). While no one knows exactly how many people were impacted by these influence campaigns,
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it has still become a concern for the U.S. government. Members of Congress have not been satisfied
with the response of major social networks (Fandos and Shane 2017) and have asked them to take
actions to prevent future interference in the U.S. democratic process by foreign actors (Price 2018).
Social network counter-measures are needed to combat these influence campaigns. This could
consist of one using social network agents to influence a network in a way that negates the effect of
the malicious influence campaign. There are multiple components to such counter-measures, but
a key one is identifying targets in the network for influence by these agents. If one has a limited
supply of agents, then one needs a method to optimally identify high value targets.
Our Contributions. In this work we present a method to identify such targets and quantify
the impact of so called stubborn agents on the opinions of others in the network. We begin by
proposing a model for opinion dynamics in a social network. A novel aspect of our model is that
the individuals are allowed to grow stubborn with time and be less affected by new posts. This
reflects real behaviors in social networks and is motivated by research in both social psychology
and political science. We prove that under fairly general conditions on the stubbornness rate, when
there are stubborn agents in the network, the opinions converge to an equilibrium given by a linear
system. Using our equilibrium, we derive a simple closed form expression for the function known
as harmonic influence centrality, which quantifies how much a single node can shift the average
opinion in a network.
Using our equilibrium solution, we then present a discrete optimization formulation for the
problem of optimally placing stubborn agents in a network to maximally shift opinions. We consider
a slight variant of the traditional influence maximization approaches where instead of converting a
non-stubborn agent into a stubborn agent, we simply introduce a stubborn agent into the network
and constrain the number of individuals that this agent can communicate with. We consider two
objective functions: the average opinion in the network and the number of individuals in the network
whose opinion is above a given threshold. We show that the average opinion is a monotone and
submodular function, allowing us to utilize a greedy approach where we place stubborn agents one
at a time in the network. Finally, we show in simulated networks that having stubborn agents target
a small number of nodes can non-trivially influence a large population. The effect is especially
pronounced when one wants to maximize the threshold objective function.
This paper is outlined as follows. We begin with a literature review in Section 2. We then present
our opinion dynamics model and convergence results in Section 3. Our optimization formulation
for agent placement is presented in Section 4. We present our expression for harmonic influence
centrality in Section 5. Simulation results for the impact of stubborn agents are presented in Section
6. We conclude in Section 7.
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2. Literature Review
There has been a rich literature studying opinion dynamics in social networks. One of the most
popular models here is the voter model (Clifford and Sudbury 1973, Holley and Liggett 1975)
where each node updates its opinion to match that of a randomly selected neighbor. There is a
large body of literature studying limiting behavior in this model (Cox and Griffeath 1986, Gray
1986, Krapivsky 1992, Liggett 2012, Sood and Redner 2005). The model of DeGroot (1974) is
another popular way to describe opinion dynamics. In this model, a node’s opinion is updated to
a convex combination of the opinions of itself and its neighbors. This model has connections with
distributed consensus algorithms (Jadbabaie et al. 2003, Olshevsky and Tsitsiklis 2009, Tsitsiklis
et al. 1986, Tsitsiklis 1984). In contrast to these approaches, there are also Bayesian models of
opinion dynamics in social networks (Acemoglu et al. 2011, Banerjee and Fudenberg 2004, Banerjee
1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Jackson 2010). In these model, a node’s opinion is updated using
Bayes’ Theorem applied to the opinions of its neighbors.
The notion of stubborn agents with immutable opinions was introduced by Mobilia (2003).
Analysis has been done of the impact of stubborn agents in various opinion models (Acemog˘lu
et al. 2013, Chinellato et al. 2015, Galam and Jacobs 2007, Ghaderi and Srikant 2013, Mobilia
et al. 2007, Wu and Huberman 2004, Yildiz et al. 2013). In Ghaderi and Srikant (2013) the authors
studied stubborn agents in the model of DeGroot (1974) and observed that an analogy can be made
between the equilibrium opinions and voltages in an electrical circuit. We find a similar connection
in our results. This electric circuit connection led Vassio et al. (2014) to propose a function known
as harmonic influence centrality, which measured how much a single node could shift the average
opinion in the network by switching its own opinion.
The question of optimizing the placement of agents in a social network to maximize some type
of influence was first proposed by Kempe et al. (2003) for a diffusion model. Subsequent results
have presented a variety of algorithms for this problem (Chen et al. 2009, 2010, Kempe et al. 2005,
Leskovec et al. 2007). Yildiz et al. (2013) studied optimal stubborn agent placement in the voter
model. Generally speaking, these algorithms make use of the fact that the objective function is
submodular, so a good solution can be found using a greedy approach, as shown by Nemhauser
et al. (1978). Our optimization formulation for placing agents in a network also makes use of this
property.
While much analysis has been done on the effect of stubborn agents, the models used assume that
the other individuals in the network have stationary behavior. However, numerous psychological
studies have found that people grow stubborn over time (see the review in Roberts et al. (2006) and
the references therein). In politics especially, the bulk of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis
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that susceptibility to changes in ideology and partisanship is very high during early adulthood
and significantly lower later in life (Alwin and Krosnick 1991, Alwin et al. 1991, Converse and
Markus 1979, Glenn 1980, Jennings and Markus 1984, Jennings and Niemi 2014, Markus 1979,
Sears 1975, 1981, 1983, Sears and Funk 1999). Therefore, we believe that opinion dynamics models
should include time-varying opinion update processes, where agents become stubborn with time.
Convergence conditions under time-varying dynamics have been studied in Chatterjee and Seneta
(1977) and later in Hatano and Mesbahi (2005), Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie (2008), Wu (2006).
These models do not explicitly consider increasing stubbornness nor the presence of stubborn
agents. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to rigorously analyze convergence in an
opinion dynamics model with stubborn agents and increasing stubbornness.
3. Model
We consider a finite set of agents V = {1, . . . ,N} situated in a social network represented by a
directed graph G (V,E), where E is the set of edges representing the connectivity among these
individuals. An edge (i, j)∈ E is considered to be directed from i to j and this means that content
posted by i can be seen by j. One can view the direction of the edges as indicating the flow of
information. In social networks parlance, we say j follows i. We define the neighbor set of an agent
i ∈ V as Ni = {j | (j, i)∈ E}. This is the set of individuals who i follows, i.e. whose posts can be
seen by i.
At each time t∈Z≥0, each agent i∈ V holds an opinion θi(t)∈ [0,1]. We definite the full vector of
beliefs at time t by θ(t) for simplicity. We also allow there to be two types of agents: non-stubborn
and stubborn. Non-stubborn agents have an opinion update rule based on communication with
their neighbors that we will specify later, while stubborn agents never change their opinions. We
will denote the set of stubborn agents by V0 ∈ V and the set of non-stubborn agents by V1 = V \ V0.
For clarity of exposition, we assume that V0 = {1, . . . , |V0|}.
At time t = 0, each agent i ∈ V starts with an initial belief θi(0). The beliefs of the stubborn
agents stays constant in time, meaning
θi(t) = θi(0), i∈ V0, t∈Z≥0.
We will now introduce the belief update rule for the non-stubborn agents. In our analysis, we will
focus on a scenario where at each time t ∈ Z≥0 a random agent j ∈ V communicates by posting
content which is broadcast to all of its neighbors in Nj.1 If agent j communicates at time t+ 1,
we assume that its post has a random opinion Yj(t+ 1) ∈ [0,1] where E [Yj(t+ 1)|θj(t)] = θj(t). If
1 Our results naturally extend to other settings of communication, we simply choose to focus on this broadcast model
because of it captures how many popular social networks, such as Twitter and Instagram, operate.
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agent j communicates at time t+ 1, all agents i such that j ∈Ni update their belief to a convex
combination of their own current belief and agent j’s communicated opinion:
θi(t+ 1) = (1−ω(t))θi(t) +ω(t)Yj(t+ 1) (1)
where ω(t)∈ [0,1] is some stubbornness factor that is changing in time. On the other hand, if none
of the agents that i follows communicate at time t+ 1, then θi(t+ 1) = θi(t).
We now note that in many previous studies, the random opinion Yj(t+1) is often always assumed
to be agent j’s exact opinion at time t, given by θj(t). In our analysis, we relax this and only assume
that agent j communicates an opinion Yj(t+1)∈ [0,1] that is unbiased, meaning E [Yj(t+ 1)|θj(t)] =
θj(t).
One should note that as ω(t) shrinks to zero, agents become more and more stubborn. In previous
studies, ω(t) is assumed to be constant in time, which is not necessarily an accurate model of
human behavior. As suggested in Mason, Conroy, and Smith Mason et al. (2007) and Roberts and
Viechtbauer Roberts et al. (2006), a model with limited verbalistion and time-evolving update
rules is a more realistic model of opinion dynamics.
One interesting case is where ω(t) = (t+ 1)−1 and an agent i observes exactly one opinion at
every unit of time. This corresponds to an update rule where an individual’s opinion is simply the
average of all previous posts he has seen. Assume the individual has an opinion at time t given by
the average of all previous posts:
θi(t) =
1
t
t∑
s=1
Y (s).
Above we dropped the subscript for the origin of the posts for simplicity. Using the update rule
from equation (1), the opinion at time t+ 1 is then
θi(t+ 1) =
(
1− 1
t+ 1
)
θi(t) +
1
t+ 1
Y (t+ 1)
=
t
t+ 1
1
t
t∑
s=1
Y (s) +
1
t+ 1
Y (t+ 1)
=
1
t+ 1
t+1∑
s=1
Y (s).
Thus, agents becoming stubborn at a rate t−1 is equivalent to them forming an opinion that is the
average of all posts they have seen.
Next we describe the communication pattern of the agents. We depart from the model in Ghaderi
and Srikant (2013), where at each discrete time-step all agents in the network communicate. Rather,
we allow the agents to communicate randomly, which is a more accurate model of how individuals in
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real social networks behave. For notation, let pj denote the probability that agent j communicates
at time t. We assume the communication probabilities are constant in time. This reflects a situation
where people’s rate of activity on social networks do not change. This is a reasonable assumption
for many real social networks. For our model, we have the following stochastic update rule for
non-stubborn agents i∈ V1:
θi(t+ 1) =
{
(1−ω(t))θi(t) +ω(t)Yj(t+ 1) w.p. pj if j ∈Ni
θi(t) w.p. 1−
∑
j∈Ni pj.
Taking expectations, we have for non-stubborn agents
E [θi(t+ 1)] =E [θi(t)]
(
1−ω(t)
∑
j∈Ni
pj
)
+ω(t)
∑
j∈Ni
E [θj(t)]pj.
Then, we can write that
E [θ(t+ 1)] =A(t)E [θ(t)]
where A(t) = I+ω(t)A, and A is a |V|×V| matrix given by
Aik =

0 if i∈ V0
−∑j∈Ni pj if i∈ V1, k= i
pk if i∈ V1, k ∈Ni
0 otherwise.
(2)
Due to the structure of A we can write it in the block-matrix form
A=
[
0 0
F G
]
where F is a |V1|×|V0| matrix and G is a |V1|×|V1| matrix. The matrix F captures communications
from the stubborn agents to the non-stubborn agents, while G captures the communication network
among the non-stubborn agents. Finally, to simplify our notation, let θV0 denote the vector of
the initial opinions of the stubborn agents and θV1(t) denote the vector of the opinions of the
non-stubborn agents at time t.
One consequence of our model is that the non-stubborn agent opinions are governed only by the
stubborn agents. For any non-stubborn agent to have a unique opinion, it must be reachable from
at least one stubborn agent. Therefore, we make the following assumption throughout this work:
Assumption 1. The underlying graph G (V,E) is connected and there exists a directed path from
every non-stubborn agent to some stubborn agent.
Note that Assumption 1 is not especially stringent. First off, if the graph has multiple connected
components then the results can be applied to each connected component separately. Furthermore,
if there are some non-stubborn agents which are not reachable by any stubborn agent, then there
is no link in E connecting the set R of such non-stubborn agents to V \R. Then, once again, one
can decompose the subgraph by only considering the part of G (V,E) containing R, and apply the
standard results that do not consider stubborn agents.
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3.1. Convergence Results
We now present our convergence results for the opinions in our model. Since who communicates
and what is communicated are random, the opinions of non-stubborn agents are also random.
Therefore, there are some key questions we aim to answer. The overarching question is under what
conditions on the stubbornness factor w(t) do the opinions convergence. In more detail, we would
like to know if the opinions converge in expectation to an equilibrium, and if so, what are the
equilibrium values. Also, are the equilibrium opinions themselves random or do they converge to
deterministic values. To answer these questions, we have obtained results for the limiting values of
the expectation and variance of the opinions.
We begin with the expectation result.
Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 hold and suppose that
t∑
s=0
ω(s) diverges. Then,
lim
t→∞
E [θV1(t)] =−G−1FθV0 (3)
The result states that for convergence in expectation to occur, w(t) cannot decay too fast. If this
occurs, then what happens is that new opinions are ignored and updates will become too small.
This can result in the final opinion depending upon the initial condition. However, if w(t) decays
slow enough, where slow means
∑t
s=0w(s) diverges, then the agents will keep listening to new posts
and updating their opinions. In this case, the expectation of their final opinions are independent of
their initial value. Theorem 1 is a generalization of the result in Ghaderi and Srikant (2013) which
applies to a constant update rule. Interestingly, we obtain the same equilibrium condition as them,
despite the time varying stochastic update rule.
The equilibrium solution from Theorem 1 has a structure that resembles Ohm’s Law from circuit
theory. Such a connection was also made in Ghaderi and Srikant (2013). An electric circuit can
be viewed as a graph. Each node i has a voltage Vi and each edge (i, j) has a conductance Gij. A
current from node i to node j is defined as Iij. From Ohm’s Law we have that Iij =Gij(Vi − Vj)
(Agarwal and Lang 2005). Conservation of current requires that all current flowing to a node
must sum to zero (current flowing away from a node has a negative value). Mathematically, this is
given by
∑
j∈Ni Iji = 0. To connect the circuit model with our opinion equilibrium, we write down
equation (3) for a single non-stubborn node i. It can be shown using equation (2) that this gives∑
j∈Ni
pj(E[θj]−E[θi]) = 0. (4)
To see the circuit analogy, we define the “voltage” of a node as its expected opinion (Vi =E[θi]) and
the conductance on an edge pointing from j to i as the posting rate of j (Gji = pj). Using Ohm’s
Law, we obtain a “current” from j to i given by Iji = pj(E[θj]−E[θi]). If we enforce conservation
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of current at each node, we obtain our equilibrium solution given by equation (4) (or in matrix
form by equation (3)). The analogy is very natural for our model. The voltage is the polarity of
an individual’s opinion and stubborn agents are fixed voltage sources. The conductance measures
how easily information flows along on edge, analogous to an electrical circuit where conductance
measures how easily current flows along an edge. The equilibrium condition simply gives how
opinions/voltages are distributed in a social network/circuit. It also suggests that one can place
stubborn agents in the network to manipulate the non-stubborn opinions, just as one can place
voltage sources in a circuit to manipulate the node voltages. We discuss this more in Section 4.
We next consider the variance of the opinions. Let Σ [θ(t)] = E [[θ(t)−E[θ(t)]] [θ(t)−E[θ(t)]]T ]
denote the covariance matrix of θ(t). We have the following result.
Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and suppose that
t∑
s=0
ω(s) diverges and
t∑
s=0
ω2(s) converges.
Then,
lim
t→∞
Σ[θ(t)] = 0.
This theorem characterizes what types of ω(t) result in the covariance going to zero. Effectively, one
requires that ω(t) decays sufficiently fast. This can be interpreted qualitatively as the individuals
in the network stop listening to new posts, so their opinions stop changing.
Taken together, Theorems 1 and 2 characterize the class of stubbornness factors ω(t) where
convergence occurs. If ω(t) decreases sufficiently rapidly (
∑t
s=0ω
2(s) converges), then the opinions’
covariance will go to zero. This sets an upper bound on how fast w(t) can decrease and still have
final opinions which are not random. However, if w(t) does not decrease too rapidly (
∑t
s=0ω(s)
diverges) then the final opinions do not depend upon the initial condition. This is the lower bound
on how fast w(t) decreases. Within this region, the opinions will converge to constants which are
independent of the initial condition. To parameterize this region, assume ω(t) has the form t−δ.
Then Theorems 1 and 2 are satisfied for 1/2 < δ ≤ 1. We illustrate these convergence regions in
Figure 1.
3.2. Stochastic Approximation and Opinion Dynamics
There is an interesting connection between our convergence results for opinion dynamics and well
known convergence results from stochastic approximation. To make the connection, we assume
that each non-stubborn agent i in the network has a loss function Ji(θ). This function can depend
upon all opinions in the network, but typically it measures the disagreement between the opinion
of i with its neighbors. The goal of each non-stubborn agent in the network is to achieve some form
of consensus by minimizing its loss function through adjustments of its own opinion.
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Figure 1 Plot of the different convergence regions for our opinion dynamics model as a function of the stubborn-
ness factor w(t).
One way to minimize the loss function is by gradient descent. However, in many situations, one
does not observe the gradient, but a noisy version of it. Optimizing a function with a noisy gradient
is known as stochastic approximation. We assume the noise term at step t is i(t) and has zero
mean. If the step size of the update at step t is ω(t), then the noisy gradient step is given by
θi(t+ 1) = θi(t)−ω(t)
(
∂Ji
∂θi
∣∣∣
θi=θi(t)
+ i(t)
)
. (5)
In a famous result of Robbins and Monro, it was shown that convergence occurs in L2 if
t∑
s=0
ω(s)
diverges and
t∑
s=0
ω2(s) converges (Robbins and Monro 1951). These conditions are the same as
our convergence conditions in Theorems 1 and 2. This is interesting because our model is very
different from the setting considered by Robbins and Monro. In our model, we are not trying to
minimize a single function. Rather, each non-stubborn agent in the network is trying to minimize
a different loss function which depends on the opinions of itself and its neighbors. Also, the agents
can only modify their own opinion. This means that the loss functions are constantly changing as
the neighbors update their opinions.
To make a connection with stochastic approximation, we need to update opinions using a noisy
gradient of a loss function. We choose a quadratic loss that gives more weight to neighbors that
have a higher posting probability. For non-stubborn agent i, the loss function is
Ji(θ) =
1
2
∑
j∈Ni
pj (θi− θj)2
and the gradient is
∂Ji
∂θi
=
∑
j∈Ni
pj (θi− θj) .
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We will now show how our opinion update rule is equivalent to this gradient plus zero mean noise.
To do so, we define three types of random variables. We let Xij(t) be a random variable which
is one if i posts to j at time t and zero otherwise. We let Zi(t) be one if no neighbor of i posts
at time t and zero otherwise. The expectations of these random variables are E[Xij(t)] = pi and
E[Zi(t)] = 1 −
∑
j∈Ni pj. We let Yi(t) be the opinion of a post of i at time t, with conditional
expectation E[Yi(t)|θi(t)] = θi(t). We can write the opinion update rule from equation (1) for agent
i using these random variables as
θi(t+ 1) = θi(t) +ω(t)
(∑
j∈Ni
Xji(t)Yj(t) + (Zi(t)− 1)θi(t)
)
. (6)
By adding and subtracting the means of these random variables conditioned on θ(t) we obtain
θi(t+ 1) = θi(t) +ω(t)
(∑
j∈Ni
(Xji(t)Yj(t)− pjθj(t) + pjθj(t)) +
(
Zi(t)− 1 +
∑
j∈Ni
pj −
∑
j∈Ni
pj
)
θi(t)
)
=θi(t) +ω(t)
(∑
j∈Ni
pj(θj(t)− θi(t)) + (Xji(t)Yj(t)− pjθj(t)) +
(
Zi(t)−
(
1−
∑
j∈Ni
pj
))
θi(t)
)
=θi(t)−ω(t)
(∑
j∈Ni
pj(θi(t)− θj(t)) + i(t)
)
= θi(t)−ω(t)
(
∂Ji
∂θi
∣∣∣
θi=θi(t)
+ i(t)
)
where we have defined the zero mean noise term i(t). We see that in our model, whenever an
agent i posts, all of its neighbors update their opinions using a noisy gradient, where the noise
comes from uncertainty in who posts and what they post. Viewed from the stochastic approxi-
mation perspective, every social media post is a gradient update for opinions in the network. The
stubbornness factor ω(t) is just the step size used for the update, and this step size decreases to
zero.
3.3. Proof of Theorem 1
Let λ be an arbitrary eigenvalue of A with corresponding eigenvector v. Then, due to the fact that
I+A is a stochastic matrix, by the Perron-Frobenius Theorem we know that |λ+ 1| ≤ 1 for all
eigenvalues λ of A. Now, consider the Jordan canonical form of the matrix A. First off, because
I+A is stochastic and reducible with aperiodic recurrent states, then the algebraic and geometric
multiplicities of the eigenvalue equal to one (of I+A) are equal to the number of communication
classes (Bre´maud 2013, p. 198). Because of this, we know that the Jordan Canonical form of A
can be written as
A=V−1

0|V0|×|V0|
J1
. . .
Jk
V
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where Ji are Jordan block matrices of the form
Ji =

λi 1
λi
. . .
. . . 1
λi

and |1 + λi| < 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Furthermore, the matrix V has as columns the respective
generalized eigenvectors of A. By expressing the Jordan matrix as J, we have the standard Jordan
canonical form A=V−1JV. Now, consider the function given by
ft(A) = (I+ω(t)A) (I+ω(t− 1)A) · · · (I+ω(0)A)
=V−1ft(J)V.
Using this functional form, we have that
E [θ(t+ 1)] = ft(A)E [θ(0)] =V−1ft(J)VE [θ(0)] .
Due to the block structure of the Jordan matrix J, we have that
ft(J) =

ft
(
0|V0|×|V0|
)
ft (J1)
. . .
ft (Jk)
 .
Now, from the form of ft it is clear that ft
(
0|V0|×|V0|
)
= I|V0|×|V0|. For the Jordan block matrices,
we will utilize the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. For all Jordan blocks Ji, we have the following
lim
t→∞
ft (Ji) = 0 .
Using Lemma 1, we now have the following
lim
t→∞
E [θ(t)] =V−1
[
I|V0|×|V0| 0
0 0
]
VE [θ(0)] .
To obtain our final result, we must express the above equation in terms of G and F. To do this,
we define the matrices
V=
[
V00 V01
V10 V11
]
, V−1 =
[
V−100 V
−1
01
V−110 V
−1
11
]
, J=
[
0 0
0 J′
]
.
Using this notation, the limiting matrix becomes
V−1
[
I 0
0 0
]
V=
[
V−100 V
−1
01
V−110 V
−1
11
][
I 0
0 0
][
V00 V01
V10 V11
]
=
[
I V−100 V01
V−110 V00 V
−1
10 V01
]
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where we have assumed the identity matrix I has the proper size determined by the context to
simplify the notation. Now we use the condition A=V−1JV to obtain[
0 0
F G
]
=
[
V−100 V
−1
01
V−110 V
−1
11
][
0 0
0 J′
][
V00 V01
V10 V11
]
=
[
V−101 J
′V10 V
−1
01 J
′V11
V−111 J
′V10 V
−1
11 J
′V11
]
.
This gives us the following two useful relationships:
F=V−111 J
′V10
G=V−111 J
′V11.
Next, we use the condition I=V−1V to obtain[
I 0
0 I
]
=
[
V−100 V
−1
01
V−110 V
−1
11
][
V00 V01
V10 V11
]
=
[
I+V−101 V10 V
−1
00 V01 +V
−1
01 V11
V−110 V00 +V
−1
11 V10 I+V
−1
10 V01
]
.
This gives us the following useful relationships:
V−110 V01 = 0
V−101 V10 = 0
V−100 V01 =−V−101 V11
−V−111 V10 =V−110 V00.
Using all of these relationships we obtain
−G−1F=−V−111 J′−1V11V−111 J′V10
=−V−111 V10
=V−110 V00.
Putting all of these results together we get
lim
t→∞
E [θ(t)] =V−1
[
I|V0|×|V0| 0
0 0
]
VE [θ(0)]
=
[
I|V0|×|V0| 0
−G−1F 0
]
E [θ(0)] ,
which provides the desired result
lim
t→∞
E [θV1(t)] =−G−1FθV0 .
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3.4. Proof of Lemma 1
For notation let D= {z ∈C : |z+ 1|< 1}, and let ni×ni be the size of the Jordan block Ji. Because
the function ft is a product of analytic functions on D, then ft is analytic on the set D. Thus we
have that
ft (Ji) =

ft(λi) f
(1)
t (λi)
f
(2)
t (λi)
2!
· · · f
(ni−1)
t (λi)
(ni−1)!
ft(λi) f
(1)
t (λi) · · · f
(ni−2)
t (λi)
(ni−2)!
. . .
. . .
...
ft(λi) f
(1)
t (λi)
ft(λi)

where f
(j)
t is the j-th derivative of the function ft (see (Higham 2008, p. 2-4) for more information
on analytic functions applied to the Jordan canonical form of a matrix).
Now, because
t∑
j=0
ω(j) diverges, this implies that the sequence of functions {ft}t≥0 converges
uniformly to 0 on any E ⊂D such that E is a closed subset of C. For x∈D take rx > 0 such that
{z : |z−x| ≤ rx} ⊂D. Then, from Cauchy’s Differentiation formula we have that
f
(j)
t (x) =
j!
2pii
∫
|z−x|=rx
ft(z)
(z−x)j+1dz .
Now, we have that |ft(z)| → 0 uniformly on {z : |z−x|= rx}. Thus, from the above f (j)t (z)→ 0. By
applying the above to every eigenvalue λi ∈D, we obtain the desired result.
3.5. Proof of Theorem 2
We begin by writing θ(t+ 1) in the following form:
θ(t+ 1) =A(t)θ(t) +ω(t)(t)
where (t) is a bounded random vector of dimension |V| such that E [(t) | θ(t)] = 0 and i(t) ∈
[−1,1]. Because of the above relation, we have that
Cov [θ(t), (t)] =E
[
θ(t)(t)T
]−E [θ(t)]E [(t)]T
=E
[
θ(t)E
[
(t)T | θ(t)]]−E [θ(t)]0T
=E
[
θ(t)0T
]
= 0.
Due to the fact that (t) and θ(t) are uncorrelated, we have the following:
Σ [θ(t+ 1)] =A(t)Σ [θ(t)]A(t)T +ω2(t)Σ [(t)] .
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Using the fact that Σ [θ(0)] = 0 and that the stubborn agents opinion vector is a constant in time
we have that
Σ [θV1(t+ 1)] = ω
2(t)Σ [(t)] +
t−1∑
j=0
ω2(j)B(t, j+ 1)Σ [(j)]B(t, j+ 1)
T
whereB(t, j+1) =A(t)A(t−1) · · ·A(j+1), the matrixA(t) is the submatrix ofA(t) corresponding
to the non-stubborn agents, and (t) is the subvector of (t) corresponding to the non-stubborn
agents. Now, for convention let B(t, j + 1) = I for j + 1 > t. For notation let X  Y if Y −X is
contained in the positive semi-definite cone. Then, we have that
Σ [θV1(t+ 1)]w2(t)Σ [(t)] +
∞∑
j=0
ω2(j)B(t, j+ 1)Σ [(j)]B(t, j+ 1)
T
Now, because ω(t)(t)∈ [−ω(t), ω(t)], by Popoviciu’s inequality we know that Var{i(t)} ≤ ω2(t)≤
1 for all i. Furthermore, by Cauchy-Schwarz we know that Cov {i(t), j(t)} ≤ 1 for all i and j.
Thus, we know that Σ [(t)]≤C for all t, where C is the matrix of all ones and the inequality holds
element-wise.
Now, we have that
B(t, j+ 1)Σ [(j)]B(t, j+ 1)
T ≤B(t, j+ 1)CB(t, j+ 1)T
≤C
where the second inequality holds from the fact that the matrices A(t) are substochastic for all t.
Then by the dominated convergence theorem, because
t∑
j=1
ω2(j) converges absolutely, we have that
lim
t→∞
Σ[θV1(t+ 1)]
∞∑
j=1
ω2(j) lim
t→∞
B(t, j+ 1)Σ [(j)]B(t, j+ 1)
T
Now, we must prove that limt→∞B(t, j + 1) = 0 for all j. However, this follows immediately from
the fact that A(t) is a substochastic irreducible matrix and
t∑
j=1
ω(j) diverges. Thus, using the fact
that Σ [θ(t)] is a positive semi-definite matrix for all t, we get the desired result:
lim
t→∞
Σ[θ(t)] = 0.
4. Optimization of Stubborn Agent Placement
The equilibrium condition in equation (3) can be rewritten as −GE[θV1 ] =FθV0 . This linear system
of equations constrains the opinions of the non-stubborn individuals. However, the terms in the
matrices can be adjusted by the placement of stubborn agents in the network. We now consider the
problem of how one can optimize a function of non-stubborn opinions via stubborn agent placement.
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We consider two different objective functions. First, there is the sum of the non-stubborn opinions.
Second, there is the number of non-stubborn individuals whose opinion exceeds a given threshold.
This is a non-linear objective which may be relevant if the individuals take some sort of action
when their opinion exceeds the threshold (buy a product, watch a movie, etc.).
Consider the scenario where we add one stubborn agent to the network with communication
rate p. Without loss of generality, we assume that this agents’ opinion θ = 1. This simplifies our
formulation and is also a reasonable assumption if the goal is to maximize the shift of opinion in the
network. Suppose that we begin with some equilibrium solution θ0 that satisfies −Gθ0 =FθV0 . Here
we are assuming the opinions are deterministic, which is a valid assumption under the conditions of
Theorem 2. Consider adding this new stubborn agent to the network and having it connect to non-
stubborn agent i. Let ei be a vector that has component i equal to one, and all other components
equal to zero. Then, by adding this new stubborn agent and having it connect to agent i we then
achieve the new equilibrium solution θ1 given by
− (G− p eieTi )θ1 =FθV0 + pei.
Formally, consider the set function f : V1 7→R≥0 defined to be
f(S) =−eT
(
G− p
∑
i∈S
eie
T
i
)−1(
FθV0 + p
∑
i∈S
ei
)
where e is the vector of all one’s. Then the problem of determining which k non-stubborn agents to
connect with in order to maximize the sum of influence of the non-stubborn agents can be written
as:
max
S : |S|=k
f(S). (7)
Additionally, once can also consider the set function g : V1 7→R≥0 defined to be
g(S) =
∑
i∈V1
Ii
−
(
G− p
∑
i∈S
eie
T
i
)−1(
FθV0 + p
∑
i∈S
ei
)
where Ii {x} is equal to one if the i-th component of x is greater than some predetermined threshold
τ , and zero otherwise. Maximizing this set function is equivalent to maximizing the number of
non-stubborn agents with final opinion greater than τ , which could correspond to for instance
buying a product or voting for a particular candidate.
In practice, these discrete optimization formulations may become too large to solve for all k
stubborn agents simultaneously. One solution to this is to solve the formulations for one stubborn
agent at a time (actually one stubborn agent edge to a non-stubborn agent at a time). This greedy
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approach greatly reduces the complexity of the problems and allows them to be solved for large
networks. While we cannot provide any performance guarantees for the threshold objective using
this greedy approach, we do have a guarantee for the sum of opinions.
Theorem 3. For an arbitrary instance of G, F, and θV0 the set function f(·) is monotone and
submodular.
Because the objective is monotone and submodular, a greedy approach to problem 7 will produce a
solution within a factor of 1−e−1 of the optimum (Nemhauser et al. 1978). In Section 6 we present
performance results of greedy solutions for these two objective functions.
4.1. Integer Programming Formulation
We now present a linear integer programming formulation for the optimal stubborn agent placement
problems with both sum and threshold objective functions. We assume that the stubborn agents
are advocating on specific point of view as part of an influence campaign, so their opinions are
equal to one. We define binary decision variables Fij which equal one if stubborn agent i connects
to non-stubborn individual j. We also define the opinion θi for non-stubborn individual i. Here we
are assuming the opinions are deterministic, which is a valid assumption under the conditions of
Theorem 2. We let the posting probability for individual i to individual j be pij. To simplify our
formulation we assume the posting probability of the stubborn agents is fixed. Then the equilibrium
conditions can be written as
θi
∑
j∈V
pji−
∑
j∈V1
pjiθj +
∑
k∈V0
zki =
∑
k∈V0
pkiFki, i∈ V1
0≤ zki ≤ Fki, i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
zki ≤ θi, i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
zki ≥ θi− (1−Fki), i∈ V1, k ∈ V0.
Above, we have introduced the auxiliary variable zki in order to make the constraints linear. We
also want to limit the out-degree of each stubborn agent and the in-degree of each non-stubborn
individual. This is a practical consideration, as if these constraints are violated, the agents may
have less ability to influence as they will appear to be artificial. These constraints are simply
∑
i∈V1
Fki ≤Dout, k ∈ V0∑
k∈V0
Fki ≤Din, i∈ V1.
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For the opinion sum, the objective is simply
∑
i∈V1 θi. The threshold objective can be written
in linear form as follows. Let the opinion threshold be τ . Then the number of individuals whose
opinion is above τ is given by
∑
i∈V1 yi, where the binary variables yi satisfy
(1− τ)yi ≥ θi− τ, i∈ V1
τyi ≤ θi, i∈ V1.
To summarize, we have two integer programming formulations for optimizing the opinions of
non-stubborn agents in a network using stubborn agents. To maximize the sum of opinions, or
equivalently the average opinion in the network one solves
max
θ,F,z
∑
i∈V1
θi∑
i∈V1
Fki ≤Dout, k ∈ V0∑
k∈V0
Fki ≤Din, i∈ V1
θi
∑
j∈V
pji−
∑
j∈V1
pjiθj +
∑
k∈V0
zki =
∑
k∈V0
pkiFki, i∈ V1
0≤ zki ≤ Fki, i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
zki ≤ θi, i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
zki ≥ θi− (1−Fki), i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
zki ∈ {0,1} , i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
Fki ∈ {0,1} , i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
0≤ θi ≤ 1, i∈ V1.
To maximize the number of non-stubborn agents with opinion exceeding a threshold τ one solves
max
θ,F,z
∑
i∈V1
yi∑
i∈V1
Fki ≤Dout, k ∈ V0∑
k∈V0
Fki ≤Din, i∈ V1
θi
∑
j∈V
pji−
∑
j∈V1
pjiθj +
∑
k∈V0
zki =
∑
k∈V0
pkiFki, i∈ V1
0≤ zki ≤ Fki, i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
zki ≤ θi, i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
zki ≥ θi− (1−Fki), i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
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(1− τ)yi ≥ θi− τ, i∈ V1
τyi ≤ θi, i∈ V1
zki ∈ {0,1} , i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
Fki ∈ {0,1} , i∈ V1, k ∈ V0
0≤ θi ≤ 1, i∈ V1
yi ∈ {0,1} , i∈ V1.
One issue with these formulations is the size can become large. The number of variables and
constraints is on the order of |V0||V1|. For example, a network with 100,000 non-stubborn agents
and 1,000 stubborn agent, this gives approximately 100 million variables and constraints, which
may not be easy to solve with current technologies. To overcome this computational challenge, one
can use the previously discussed greedy and solve for the placement of a single stubborn agent at a
time. By doing this the formulation size will reduce to the order of |V1|, which may be much easier
to solve.
4.2. Proof of Theorem 3
We consider the objective function of the sum of the non-stubborn opinions. We will show that
adding a new edge from a stubborn agent to non-stubborn node will result in a diminished gain for
a network with a larger number of such edges. This will establish that the objective is submodular.
The challenge is to take into account the fact that the non-stubborn opinions are constrained by
the linear system from the equilibrium condition.
We assume the equilibrium condition of the base network is given
−Gθ0 =FθV0 = b.
Above, we have included all information about the edges between stubborn and non-stubborn
nodes in the vector b. When we add a single stubborn to non-stubborn edge, we must update the
diagonal element of G for the row of the non-stubborn node. We assume that the new edge falls on
non-stubborn node k and the stubborn agent posting probability is p. We define the vector ek as
the vector with element k equal to one, and all other elements equal to zero. With this notation,
the new equilibrium is given by
(−G+ pekeTk )θ1 = b+ pek.
We also consider a network which is the base network plus an edge from a stubborn node to
non-stubborn node l with posting probability q. Then we have the following different equilibrium
conditions:
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−Gθ0 = b
(−G+ pekeTk )θ1 = b+ pek
(−G+ qeleTl )θ2 = b+ qel
(−G+ qeleTl + pekeTk )θ3 = b+ qel + pek.
We define the objective function U(θ) =
∑
i∈V1 θi. To establish submodularity, we need to show
that
U(θ1)−U(θ0)≥U(θ3)−U(θ2).
We will make use of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let θ0 be the opinion equilibrium given by −Gθ0 = b and let θ1 be the opinion equilib-
rium given by adding a single edge between a stubborn agent and non-stubborn agent k with posting
probability p. Then
U(θ1)−U(θ0) =−p(1− θ
0
k)
1− pG−1kk
∑
i∈V1
G−1ki .
Lemma 3. All elements of the matrix −G−1 are non-negative.
We note that for any i ∈ V1, θ0i ≤ θ2i because adding a single stubborn edge with opinion equal to
one cannot decrease any non-stubborn opinion. This follows immediately from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Let H=G− qeleTl . Using Lemma 2 we have
U(θ1)−U(θ0)≥U(θ3)−U(θ2)
−p(1− θ
0
k)
1− pG−1kk
∑
j∈V1
G−1kj ≥−
p(1− θ2k)
1− pH−1kk
∑
j∈V1
H−1kj
−p(1− θ
0
k)
1− pG−1kk
∑
j∈V1
G−1kj ≥−
p(1− θ0k)
1− pH−1kk
∑
j∈V1
H−1kj
∑
j∈V1
G−1kj
1− pG−1kk
≤
∑
j∈V1
H−1kj
1− pH−1kk
. (8)
If we show this inequality to be true, the proof of Theorem 3 is complete. To do this, we utilize
the Sherman-Morrison formula (Sherman and Morrison 1950) which states that
(G− pekeTk )−1ij =G−1ij +
pG−1ik G
−1
kj
1− pG−1kk
.
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Applying the Sherman-Morrison formula to each term in the sum in the right side of equation (8)
we obtain
H−1kj
1− pH−1kk
=
G−1kj +
qG−1
kl
G−1
lj
1−qG−1
ll
1− pG−1kk − pqG
−1
kl
G−1
lk
1−qG−1
ll
=
G−1kj (1− qG−1ll ) + qG−1kl G−1lj
(1− pG−1kk )(1− qG−1ll )− pqG−1kl G−1lk
.
We now use this relationship to establish the inequality for each term in the sum in equation (8).
G−1kj
1− pG−1kk
≤ H
−1
kj
1− pH−1kk
G−1kj
1− pG−1kk
≤ G
−1
kj (1− qG−1ll ) + qG−1kl G−1lj
(1− pG−1kk )(1− qG−1ll )− pqG−1kl G−1lk
−pqG−1kl G−1kj G−1lk ≤ qG−1kl G−1lj (1− pG−1kk )
−pG−1kj G−1lk ≥G−1lj (1− pG−1kk )
0≥G−1lj +
G−1lk G
−1
kj
1− pG−1kk
0≥ (G− pekeTk )−1lj . (9)
Equation (9) is a direct result of the Sherman-Morrison formula. Applying Lemma 3 we have that
equation (9) is true, establishing condition (8) and proving the theorem.
4.3. Proof of Lemma 2
We assume the matrix G is n× n. We assume we have an equilibrium solutions −Gθ0 = b and
−(G− pekeTk )θ1 = b+ pek. Using the Sherman-Morrison formula, we can write the difference in
objective functions as
U(θ1)−U(θ0) =
n∑
i=1
(
− (G− pekeTk )−1(b+ pek))
i
+
n∑
i=1
(G−1b)i
=−p
n∑
i=1
(G−1ek)i− p
n∑
i=1
(
G−1ekeTkG
−1
1− pG−1kk
(b+ pek)
)
i
=−p
n∑
i=1
(
G−1ki +
G−1ki (−θ0k + pG−1kk )
1− pG−1kk
)
=−p(1− θ
0
k)
1− pG−1kk
n∑
i=1
G−1ki .
4.4. Proof of Lemma 3
First off, note that the matrix −G is a Z-matrix because all of its off-diagonal elements are non-
positive. Furthermore,the eigenvalues of −G have positive real part by Gershgorin’s Circle theorem
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(Gershgorin 1931) and the fact that −∑nj=1Gij ≥ 0. Thus, by definition, −G is an M-matrix.
The result follows from the fact that the inverse of a non-singular M-matrix is nonnegative. See
Plemmons (1977) for a review of Z and M-matrices, and for the details on the proof of the fact
that the inverse of a non-singular M-matrix is non-negative.
5. Harmonic Influence Centrality
The equilibrium condition of our model given by equation (3) (or equivalently equation (4)) allows
us to evaluate the relative influence of each individual agent in the network. We define influence
as follows. Imagine we are able to switch an agent’s opinion from zero to one and ask what is the
change in the average opinion in the network as a result of this switch. This allows us to define
harmonic influence centrality which was first proposed in Vassio et al. (2014). There, harmonic
influence centrality measured the average opinion in a network with stubborn agents when an agent
had the fixed opinion equal to one. We follow this logic and define harmonic influence centrality
as a function c : V → R that maps each agent in the network to a real number that equals this
change in average opinion. We now present expressions for the influence centrality of agents in the
network. We consider the case of stubborn and non-stubborn agents separately, as they result in
different expressions.
Theorem 4. Consider a network with opinion equilibrium given by −Gθ1 =Fθ0. For any stubborn
agent i∈ V0, the harmonic influence centrality is
c(i) =
−1
|V1|
∑
j∈V1
(
G−1F
)
ji
(10)
and for any non-stubborn agent i∈ V1, the harmonic influence centrality is
c(i) =
1
|V1| − 1
(∑
j∈V1G
−1
ji
G−1ii
− 1
)
. (11)
As can be seen, the expression for the harmonic influence centrality of stubborn agent i is just the
sum of the ith column of the matrix G−1F. Unlike for stubborn agents, the harmonic influence
centrality of non-stubborn agents does not involve the matrix F which connects stubborn to non-
stubborn agents. Both expressions require the matrix G which connects the non-stubborn agents,
to be invertible. This just means that the network has a unique opinion equilibrium. As such,
harmonic influence centrality is not applicable in networks where there are no stubborn agents, or
not enough stubborn agents to create a unique equilibrium. This somewhat limits the applicability
of harmonic influence centrality. However, it does make its actual value relevant for maximizing
the average or sum of opinions in networks with stubborn agents.
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5.1. Proof of Theorem 4: Stubborn Agents
For stubborn agents, we simply change their opinion from zero to one and calculate the change
in the mean opinion. We consider switching the opinion of stubborn agent i. Let θ0V0 and θ
1
V0
correspond to the opinion vector for the stubborn agents with agent i’s opinion equal to zero and
one, respectively. We define two opinion equilibriums of the non-stubborn agents corresponding to
the case where stubborn agent i has its opinion equal to one and zero as follows.
−Gθ0V1 =Fθ0V0
−Gθ1V1 =Fθ1V0 .
The difference in the equilibrium opinions is given by
θ1V1 − θ0V1 =−G−1F
(
θ1V0 − θ0V0
)
=−G−1Fei,
where ei is a vector of all zeros except for the ith component which is equal to one. We let c(i) be
the harmonic influence centrality of stubborn agent i which is equal to the change in the average
opinion. This is then given by
c(i) =
1
|V1|
∑
j∈V1
(
θ1V1 − θ0V1
)
ji
=
−1
|V1|
∑
j∈V1
(
G−1F
)
ji
.
5.2. Proof of Theorem 4: Non-stubborn Agents
For non-stubborn agents, we cannot simply switch their opinions as we did with stubborn agents.
This is because their opinions depend upon their neighbors opinions. Instead we take a different
approach. To obtain the influence centrality of a non-stubborn agent i, we connect d stubborn
agents to it with posting probability p. We then calculate the change in average opinion when these
stubborn agents’ opinion switches from zero to one. The harmonic influence centrality is given by
the limit of this opinion change as d goes to infinity. Adding an infinite number of stubborn agents
of a single opinion to a non-stubborn agent effectively makes a non-stubborn agent stubborn.
We let θ0V1 and θ
1
V1 correspond to the opinion vector for the non-stubborn agents with the d
stubborn agents opinions equal to zero and one, respectively. These equilibria are given by
(−G+ pdeieTi )θ0V1 =FθV0(−G+ pdeieTi )θ1V1 =FθV0 + pdei.
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The difference in the equilibrium opinions is given by
θ1V1 − θ0V1 =
(−G+ pdeieTi )−1 (FθV0 + pdei−FθV0)
=−pd (G− pdeieTi )−1 ei.
Because ei is only non-zero in element i, we only need to calculate the ith column of the inverse of
G− pdeieTi . This can be done using the Sherman-Morris formula Sherman and Morrison (1950),
giving
(
G− pdeieTi
)−1
ji
=G−1ji +
pdG−1ji G
−1
ii
1− pdG−1ii
=
G−1ji
1− pdG−1ii
.
We can now calculate the harmonic influence centrality of a non-stubborn agent. We must make
sure to subtract one, which is the change in the opinion of the given non-stubborn agent. This is
in contrast to stubborn agents, whose opinion shifts were not included in the calculation of the
resulting opinion shift. With this in mind, and using the above expression, the harmonic influence
centrality of non-stubborn agent i is given by
c(i) = lim
d→∞
1
|V1| − 1
 ∑
j∈V1/i
(
θ1V1 − θ0V1
)
ji

c(i) = lim
d→∞
1
|V1| − 1
(∑
j∈V1
(
θ1V1 − θ0V1
)
ji
− 1
)
= lim
d→∞
1
|V1| − 1
(∑
j∈V1
−pd (G− pdeieTi )−1ji − 1
)
= lim
d→∞
1
|V1| − 1
(∑
j∈V1
−pdG−1ji
1− pdG−1ii
− 1
)
=
1
|V1| − 1
(∑
j∈V1G
−1
ji
G−1ii
− 1
)
.
6. Results
To understand how much impact a stubborn agent can have on the opinions in a network, we solve
the influence maximization problem described in Section 4 with different objective functions on
simulated network topologies. We initiate the networks with a fixed number of stubborn agents.
Then we introduce our own stubborn agent and observe how much the objective function changes.
For all of our results, we set the posting probabilities for all nodes to be equal.
Hunter and Zaman: Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents
24 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!)
6.1. Influence Maximization on a Ring Lattice Network
We first consider a ring lattice network with 100 nodes and each node connects with its ten closest
neighbors. The network is initialized with ten stubborn agents with opinion θ= 0 located randomly
in the network. Then we introduce an agent with θ= 1 in order to maximize the sum of the opinions
and the number of agents with opinion greater than a threshold of 0.5. We allow this stubborn
agent to connect with the non-stubborn agents, so the variables we can manipulate are edges from
this stubborn agent to non-stubborn agents. We find a solution to the influence maximization
problem in a greedy manner, adding in these edges one at a time.
We plot the objective function values versus number of stubborn agent edges in Figure 2. Note
that the network initially has 100 stubborn to non-stubborn edges. If we use only 60 stubborn
agent edges, we can shift the average opinion to 0.5 and effectively neutralize the initial stubborn
agents. For the threshold objective with threshold value 0.5, there is a different behavior. The first
15 stubborn edges do not push anyone over the 0.5 threshold. Then there is a rapid increase in this
number up until the 27th edge, at which point a plateau is reached. At the 68th edge, the number
of nodes above the threshold begins to increase again. To get half of the non-stubborn agents (45
nodes in this case) above the threshold, we only need 70 stubborn edges. This is 10 more than
needed to get the average opinion to 0.5, but still less than the 100 stubborn edges initially in the
network.
6.2. Influence Maximization on a Two Cluster Network
The next network we consider consists of two clusters which are connected by a few edges. This
models the type of politically polarized structure common in modern social networks where people
exist in echo chambers only hearing a single type of opinion. Each cluster has 50 nodes, with five
of the nodes being stubborn agents. In one cluster the stubborn agents have opinion θ = 0 and
in the other they have opinion θ = 1. Within the clusters, each edge exists with probability 0.15,
and between the clusters each edge exists with probability 0.05. The initial number of stubborn
agent edges is random, but on average each stubborn agent has an out-degree of ten. This gives
100 stubborn agent edges on average. However, unlike in the ring network, these edges are split
over stubborn agents of opposite opinions.
We plot an instance of the two cluster network in Figure 3 with nodes colored by their opinion
(above or below the threshold of 0.5). The initial stubborn agents are located on the sides of the
plot and the optimized stubborn agent is in the bottom of the plot. We see that initially there
are not many non-stubborn nodes whose opinion exceeds the threshold. When we optimally place
ten stubborn agent edges, we see a huge chance in this number. These edges mainly target non-
stubborn nodes in the cluster connected to the stubborn agents whose opinion is zero (blue). From
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Figure 2 Plot of expected opinion of non-stubborn agents (left) and number of non-stubborn agents with opinion
greater than 0.5 (left) versus number of stubborn agent edges with opinion θ= 1 introduced into a ring
lattice network with 100 nodes and where each node has degree ten. The network is initialized with
ten randomly placed stubborn nodes with opinion θ= 0 who have 100 stubborn agent to non-stubborn
agent edges.
Figure 3 Plot of two cluster network with 100 nodes (left) without any optimized stubborn agents and (right)
with one optimized stubborn agent with degree ten. The red nodes correspond to opinions above 0.5
and the blue nodes correspond to opinions below 0.5. Each cluster is initiated with five stubborn nodes
with opinion zero and one which are located on the sides of each plot. The optimized stubborn agent is
located at the bottom of the plot.
the figure we see that by using only a few optimally placed stubborn agent edges, we can make
nearly the entire network have an opinion above the threshold.
To get a better sense of how the number of stubborn agent edges impact the objective functions,
we plot the objective function values versus number of stubborn agent edges for the two cluster
network in Figure 4. The network begins with an average opinion near 0.45. Each stubborn agent
edge has diminishing returns, having less impact as more are added. Nonetheless, if one was con-
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Figure 4 Plot of expected opinion of non-stubborn agents (left) and number of non-stubborn agents with opinion
greater than 0.5 (left) versus number of stubborn agent edges with opinion θ= 1 introduced into a two
cluster network with 100 nodes. Each cluster is initiated with five stubborn nodes with opinion θ = 0
and θ= 1.
cerned with pushing the average opinion over 0.5, this can be done with very few stubborn agent
edges.
For the threshold objective we see something quite interesting. Initially, each edge causes many
non-stubborn nodes to exceed the 0.5 threshold. For instance, adding four edges doubles the number
of nodes above the threshold. By approximately 20 edges the entire network is above the threshold.
This result shows the potential gains possible with a small number of stubborn agents for non-linear
functions of the opinions. This is important because in many cases the threshold function may be
a more relevant objective than the average opinion. If having an opinion above a threshold results
in some sort of action, then the threshold function is the proper objective to optimize. We see here
that the threshold function is quite sensitive, and using a small number of optimized stubborn
agents can have a disproportionate affect on the network.
6.3. Harmonic Influence Centrality on Two Cluster Network
We next investigate the harmonic influence centrality of the nodes in the two cluster network from
Figure 3. We calculate the harmonic influence centrality of both the stubborn and non-stubborn
nodes using equations (11) and (10). In Figure 5 we plot the resulting harmonic influence centralities
versus the in and out-degree of the nodes. Recall that the out-degree is the number of nodes that can
receive posts from a given node, and the in-degree is the number of nodes from which a given node
can receive posts. The out-degree captures influence, as a node with a high out-degree can reach
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many nodes. In contrast, in-degree does not reveal much about the influence of node. Therefore,
it is not surprising that we see from Figure 5 a strong correlation between harmonic influence
centrality and out-degree (correlation coefficient of 0.88, significant at 1% level ) and no relationship
between harmonic influence centrality and in-degree (no significant correlation at 5% level). We
also see that this relationship between harmonic influence centrality and out-degree holds for both
stubborn and non-stubborn agents. While the maximum harmonic influence centrality belongs to
a stubborn agent, there are many non-stubborn agents whose influence centrality exceeds stubborn
agents. Therefore, there is no clear domination of stubborn versus non-stubborn agents in terms
of harmonic influence centrality.
Despite the strong correlation between out-degree and harmonic influence centrality, we see that
multiple nodes with the same out-degree have different values of harmonic influence centrality.
This is because out-degree only uses the local neighborhood of a node. In contrast, harmonic
influence centrality measures the change in average network opinion, so it must incorporate the
entire network structure. Therefore, it is a finer measure of influence than out-degree. Also, unlike
out-degree and many other centrality measures, harmonic influence centrality is based on relevant
metric (change in average opinion), so its value has an operational interpretation. For instance, if
the non-stubborn agent with the maximum value for harmonic influence centrality could be flipped,
it would increase the average opinion by approximately 0.14. Noting that opinions are between
zero and one in our model, this translates to an significant increase in the average opinion. The
out-degree of this stubborn agent is ten, which is not the highest degree in the network. By itself,
degree does not provide any direct operational meaning in terms of influence. Instead, by using
harmonic influence centrality, we have a principled approach to evaluate the influence of nodes in
a networks.
7. Conclusion
We have proposed a model for opinion dynamics in a social network where individuals become more
stubborn with time. We were able to derive convergence results for this non-stationary model, one
of the first results of its kind. We found an analogy with electrical circuits, where opinions can be
viewed as voltages. We also found a way to view our model in terms of stochastic approximation,
where posts by agents result in noisy gradient updates to opinions. Using our convergence results,
we formulated an integer program for placing stubborn agents in a network to have maximal impact
on non-stubborn opinions. We showed that this was a submodular problem, allowing for greedy
solutions. We also derived simple expressions for harmonic influence centrality which allowed us
the measure the relative influence of agents in a network in terms of their ability to shift the
average opinion. Finally, tests on simulated networks showed that with our formulation, one can
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Figure 5 Plot of harmonic influence centrality versus in and out-degree for a two cluster network with 100 nodes.
Each cluster is initiated with five stubborn nodes with opinion θ= 0 and θ= 1.
have significant impact on opinions using only a few stubborn agents. In particular, for maximizing
the number of individuals whose opinion exceeds a threshold, a small number of stubborn agents
can have a huge impact.
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